These Vehicles will be key to China’s invasion of Taiwan
The Shuiqiao (水桥, "water bridge") class vessel are designed to form modular floating bridges for military operations, and appear to have been developed to bypass highly defended landing zones.
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I. Introduction
In March 2025, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted full-scale trials of its Shuiqiao-class modular landing barges, successfully linking multiple vessels to form a floating bridge stretching nearly 820 meters (2,690 feet). Developed by CSSC Offshore & Marine Engineering Company (COMEC), the Shuiqiao (水桥, "water bridge") system is designed to support rapid force deployment by creating temporary piers, reducing reliance on traditional beach landings and expanding options for near-shore operations. The exercise, observed near Zhanjiang in Guangdong province, represents a significant development in China’s ongoing military efforts.
The barges’ modular design—capable of interlocking like LEGO pieces—and their integration with civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries highlight China’s efforts to innovate in logistical capabilities. Analysts have noted similarities to the World War II-era Mulberry harbors, though the Shuiqiao class incorporates modern advancements such as self-propulsion, retractable stabilizing legs, and extendable Bailey bridges. These features suggest a deliberate effort to address historical amphibious limitations while aligning with President Xi Jinping’s 2027 military modernization goals.
The Shuiqiao program is part of China’s broader strategic efforts. By investing in specialized platforms, China aims to refine its tools for potential large-scale amphibious operations. The barges’ development reflects Beijing’s ongoing focus on Taiwan scenarios, where contested shorelines and asymmetric defenses pose significant challenges. However, their operational viability—particularly under combat conditions—remains untested. While the Shuiqiao system may expand the PLA’s tactical options, its effectiveness will depend on broader operational integration and the ability to sustain complex logistics in a challenging environment.
II. Development and Technical Capabilities
Design Origins and Modular Construction
The Shuiqiao-class barges represent a specialized evolution of amphibious warfare engineering, combining self-propelled landing platform utility (LPU) functionality with modular, interlocking Bailey bridge-style extensions. These extensions allow multiple vessels to connect seamlessly, forming temporary floating piers or causeways capable of spanning significant distances over water. The system draws from historical precedents—such as the WWII Mulberry harbors—but incorporates modern naval engineering to support high-tempo military operations.
Variants and Configuration Flexibility
Shuiqiao-110: The smallest variant, measuring approximately 110 meters in length, features four stabilizing legs and is optimized for shallow-water operations. Unlike its larger counterparts, it lacks a stern ramp, suggesting its primary role as a connector or intermediate link between other barges and the shore.
Shuiqiao-135: The intermediate design, at 135 meters long, incorporates six stabilizing legs and dual side-mounted platforms for roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) ferry docking. This variant is designed for moderate-depth waters and can function independently or as part of a larger assembly.
Shuiqiao-185: The largest model, spanning 185 meters, is equipped with eight retractable legs and a stern loading ramp, enabling direct integration with civilian or military transport vessels. Its enhanced stability and load capacity make it the terminal element of bridging operations, positioned farthest from shore to facilitate heavy vehicle offloading.
The modularity of these variants allows the PLA to tailor configurations to specific operational needs, whether for rapid assault landings, logistical support, or contested shoreline access.
Technical Specifications
Self-Elevating Capability: Each barge employs hydraulic legs that anchor to the seabed, which would be critical for maintaining structural integrity in dynamic maritime environments during transfers of heavy equipment such as Type 96 and Type 99 main battle tanks (weighing up to 60 tons)..
Bridge Formation: When linked, the barges create a continuous causeway (Up to 820 meters (2,690 feet) long has been observed so far), capable of supporting sustained traffic of armored vehicles, artillery, and supply convoys. The Bailey bridge extensions are engineered for rapid assembly, with observed deployment times of under 90 minutes for a 500-meter span.
Operating Range: Designed for near-shore operations within 5–10 kilometers of landing zones, the system reduces reliance on potentially vulnerable landing craft (e.g., LSTs) and fixed port infrastructure. This range aligns with PLA doctrinal emphasis on bypassing defended beaches and establishing alternate entry points.
The Shuiqiao system enhances China's amphibious capabilities by expanding viable landing sites and reducing reliance on traditional logistics, but its effectiveness depends on calm sea conditions and pre-secured landing zones. While it complicates adversary defenses and increases operational flexibility, its niche military design underscores a singular focus on cross-strait contingencies. The barges cannot replace initial assault forces and introduce logistical complexities, such as potential bottlenecks during contested landings. Future upgrades, like autonomous docking and enhanced weather resilience, are likely to address current limitations. Ultimately, the Shuiqiao barges represent a tailored solution to the PLA's amphibious challenges, with their operational success hinging on overcoming environmental and tactical constraints in high-threat environments.
III. Strategic Context and Use Case Scenarios
Amphibious Transport Concept
The Shuiqiao-class landing barges are designed to enhance near-shore logistics in scenarios where traditional amphibious ships or port facilities are unavailable, damaged, or contested. Their modular bridging capability allows the PLA to bypass heavily defended landing zones and access less fortified or otherwise unsuitable coastal segments—such as rocky shorelines, muddy tidal flats, or urbanized waterfronts—that conventional landing craft cannot exploit.
This system bears conceptual similarities to the WWII Mulberry harbors, temporary artificial ports used by Allied forces during the Normandy invasion. However, the Shuiqiao is optimized for shorter distances (5–10 km from shore) and rapid assembly (under 90 minutes for a 500-meter span), making it better suited for modern high-tempo operations. Unlike the Mulberries, which required extensive pre-deployment engineering, the Shuiqiao barges are self-propelled and can be deployed flexibly in response to battlefield conditions.
Alignment with PLA Objectives
The Shuiqiao program aligns with China’s broader 2027 military modernization goals, particularly in enhancing amphibious warfare capabilities. President Xi Jinping has emphasized the need for the PLA to achieve "world-class" status by mid-century, with 2027 serving as a critical milestone for operational readiness. The barges address key logistical challenges in potential cross-Strait operations, where Taiwan’s asymmetric defenses—such as coastal mines, anti-ship missile batteries, and fortified beach obstacles—could impede traditional landing approaches.
By enabling dispersed, off-beach landings, the Shuiqiao system:
Reduces predictability: Instead of funneling forces through a few vulnerable landing zones, the PLA can establish multiple entry points, complicating Taiwan’s defensive planning.
Improves access flexibility: The ability to link with civilian roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) ferries expands logistics options, leveraging China’s vast merchant marine for troop and equipment transport.
Supports follow-on forces: Once initial beachheads are secured, the barges can facilitate the rapid transfer of heavy armor (e.g., Type 99 tanks) and supplies, sustaining momentum in a contested environment.
Potential Use Cases
Taiwan Contingency
The primary strategic application, allowing PLA forces to circumvent Taiwan’s western coast defenses by landing vehicles and equipment on less guarded stretches of shoreline.
Could be paired with drone swarms and electronic warfare systems to suppress detection during assembly.
South China Sea Operations
Useful for rapid outpost resupply or establishing temporary staging areas on disputed reefs and islands.
Humanitarian/Disaster Relief
In non-combat scenarios, the system could restore port access after typhoons or other disruptions, though its military-focused design limits civilian utility.
Challenges and LimitationsDespite its advantages, the Shuiqiao system faces constraints:
Dependence on sea conditions: Rough waves or strong currents could hinder assembly and stability.
Vulnerability during transit: Slow-moving barges would require robust air and naval protection to survive in contested waters.
Egress bottlenecks: Even if landings succeed, narrow coastal roads could become chokepoints under artillery or missile fire.
Strategic Implications: The Shuiqiao reflects China’s asymmetric approach to amphibious warfare, prioritizing cost-effective, scalable solutions over purely high-end platforms. While not a silver bullet, it complicates adversary defense planning and underscores the PLA’s focus on logistical innovation as a force multiplier. Future iterations may incorporate autonomous navigation or improved weather resilience to address current limitations. Ultimately, the system’s effectiveness will depend on integration with broader PLA assets—including air superiority, missile strikes, and cyber operations—to secure the conditions necessary for successful deployment.
IV. 2025 Trials and Observations
Details from March 2025 Sea Trials
The PLA conducted its first full-scale operational test of the Shuiqiao system in March 2025 near Zhanjiang, Guangdong Province, adjacent to the Southern Theater Command Navy headquarters. The trials involved three Shuiqiao-185 barges linked into a 300-meter floating bridge, with civilian roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) ferries docking to simulate high-volume vehicle and personnel transfers.
Key Aspects of the Trials:
Bridge Assembly: The barges demonstrated the ability to autonomously align and interlock their Bailey bridge extensions, forming a stable causeway in under 90 minutes for a 500-meter span.
Supporting Assets:
Type 726 LCACs (air-cushion landing craft) were deployed to simulate initial amphibious troop movements across the bridge.
Satellite imagery (via Maxar and Planet Labs) confirmed the barges’ integration with civilian ferries, suggesting PLA plans to leverage merchant shipping for logistics.
Statements and Engineering Insights
Major General Li Xi (PLA Army Engineering University) emphasized the system’s ability to "establish a logistical point under contested conditions," highlighting its role in overcoming Taiwan’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies.
COMEC Engineers noted the barges’ modular redundancy—damaged sections can be replaced without collapsing the entire bridge, a critical feature for sustained operations under fire.
Andrew Erickson (China Maritime Studies Institute) observed that the trials confirmed the Shuiqiao’s ability to "bypass fortified beaches and land vehicles directly onto coastal roads," complicating Taiwan’s defensive planning.
Performance Considerations
Strengths:
Rapid Deployment: The 90-minute assembly time for a 500-meter span meets PLA requirements for high-tempo operations.
Load Capacity: Proven ability to handle heavy armor and sustain continuous vehicle flow (estimated 150+ vehicles per hour).
Flexibility: Integration with civilian ferries expands logistical options, reducing reliance on dedicated military transport.
Limitations:
Sea State Sensitivity: Trials were conducted in calm waters (Beaufort Scale 2–3); performance in rough seas (common in the Taiwan Strait) remains unverified.
Electronic Warfare Vulnerability: No data was released on resilience to jamming or cyberattacks targeting navigation systems.
Defensive Weaknesses: The barges lack armor or active protection, requiring air/sea dominance to survive in contested environments.
**Strategic Implications:**The trials underscored the Shuiqiao’s potential to reshape amphibious logistics, particularly in Taiwan scenarios where traditional landing zones are heavily defended. However, the system’s reliance on permissive conditions (calm seas, secured beachheads) and external force protection means it is not a standalone solution. Future iterations may address these gaps with autonomous docking or modular armor kits, but as of 2025, the Shuiqiao remains a high-capacity yet vulnerable component of China’s amphibious toolkit.
Open Questions:
How will the PLA mitigate the barges’ slow transit speed (5–8 knots) during a contested crossing?
Can the system scale to support multi-brigade landings, or will congestion at disembarkation points create bottlenecks?
Will Taiwan’s anti-ship missiles (e.g., Hsiung Feng III) or naval drones prove effective against these high-value, slow-moving targets?
The 2025 trials marked a critical step in validating the Shuiqiao concept, but its battlefield utility will hinge on unresolved operational and environmental challenges.
V. Future Development and Potential Roles
Deployment Timeline
The PLA aims to achieve full operational capability (FOC) for the Shuiqiao-class barges by 2026, with mass production already underway at Guangzhou Shipyard International’s Longxue Island facility. While exact procurement numbers remain classified, satellite imagery suggests at least two additional sets (six barges) are under construction, aligning with China’s accelerated military modernization goals under Xi Jinping’s 2027 deadline. Future iterations are expected to incorporate AI-driven navigation to optimize bridge alignment, reducing assembly times from the current 90 minutes (for 500m spans) to potentially under an hour. The rapid development cycle—from initial testing in March 2025 to projected FOC—highlights China’s emphasis on asymmetric solutions for amphibious warfare.
Potential Operational Roles
1. Taiwan Contingency Planning: The Shuiqiao’s primary role is to expand landing options in a cross-strait invasion scenario:
Bypassing Fortified Beaches: By enabling landings on rocky shores, urban waterfronts, or tidal flats, the barges could circumvent Taiwan’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems, such as coastal mines and anti-ship missile batteries.
Decentralized Landings: Multiple Shuiqiao bridges could disperse PLA forces across 10–20 km of coastline, complicating Taiwan’s defensive focus on traditional hotspots like Taichung or Tainan.
Follow-On Logistics: Once initial beachheads are secured, the barges could sustain high-volume transfers of heavy armor (e.g., Type 99 tanks) and supplies at rates exceeding 150 vehicles per hour.
However, challenges persist:
Dependence on Initial Assaults: The barges require secure landing zones established by first-wave forces, leaving them vulnerable if early operations stall.
Egress Bottlenecks: Taiwan’s narrow coastal roads—many flanked by urban choke points or pre-targeted artillery zones—could negate the Shuiqiao’s throughput advantages.
2. South China Sea and Disaster Response: Beyond Taiwan, the barges may support:
Outpost Resupply: Rapid cargo transfer to artificial islands (e.g., Fiery Cross Reef), bypassing port limitations.
Disaster Relief: Temporary pier construction after typhoons or earthquakes, though their military-specific design limits civilian utility compared to dedicated humanitarian vessels.
Broader Strategic Implications: The Shuiqiao program signals China’s focus on logistical innovation to offset Taiwan’s geographic defenses. Yet its niche applicability—lacking multirole flexibility—reflects a gamble on high-risk, high-reward scenarios. Future upgrades (e.g., modular armor, electronic hardening) could address vulnerabilities, but the system’s ultimate success hinges on PLA air/naval dominance to protect these slow-moving assets. As production scales, the barges may become a linchpin of China’s amphibious toolkit—or a costly liability if adversaries adapt with precision strikes or sea-denial tactics.
Key Questions for Future Assessment
Will the PLA integrate defensive countermeasures (e.g., jamming resistance, CIWS mounts)?
How will Taiwan’s Hsiung Feng III missiles or naval drones target these high-value platforms?
The Shuiqiao’s evolution will be a critical indicator of China’s amphibious readiness—and the viability of forced entry operations in contested littorals.
VI. Summary and Evaluation
The Shuiqiao-class landing barges represent a deliberate shift in amphibious warfare doctrine, introducing a modular, scalable alternative to traditional port-based or ship-to-shore logistics. By enabling rapid pier construction in near-shore environments, the system expands landing zone flexibility—allowing PLA forces to bypass heavily defended beaches and access previously unsuitable coastal terrain. This capability aligns with China’s broader A2/AD countermeasures, offering a potential workaround to Taiwan’s asymmetric coastal defenses (e.g., sea mines, anti-ship missile batteries).
Strategic Advantages
Operational Flexibility: The ability to link barges into 820-meter (2,690-foot) causeways reduces reliance on vulnerable landing craft (e.g., LSTs) and fixed ports, complicating adversary targeting strategies.
Throughput Efficiency: Potential capacity to transfer 60-ton armored vehicles (e.g., Type 99 tanks).
Modular Redundancy: Damaged sections can be replaced without collapsing the entire bridge, enhancing resilience under fire.
Critical Limitations
Environmental Sensitivity: Trials have only validated performance in calm seas (Beaufort Scale 2–3); rough waves or strong currents could destabilize the system.
Combat Vulnerability: The barges lack armor or active defenses, requiring air and naval supremacy to survive in contested waters. Their slow transit speed (5–8 knots) and large profile make them high-value targets for precision strikes.
Logistical Bottlenecks: While the barges improve ship-to-shore throughput, narrow coastal roads and urban chokepoints on Taiwan could negate their advantages by funneling forces into kill zones.
Engineering Considerations
The Shuiqiao’s design reflects pragmatic innovation, particularly its self-elevating hydraulic legs and Bailey bridge extensions. However, long-term viability hinges on addressing:
Corrosion Resistance: Saltwater exposure could degrade structural integrity without advanced coatings or materials.
Electronic Warfare Hardening: Unclear resilience to jamming or cyberattacks targeting navigation systems.
Autonomous Integration: Future iterations may incorporate AI-driven alignment to reduce assembly times below the current 90-minute benchmark for 500-meter spans.
Strategic Implications
The Shuiqiao barges underscore China’s asymmetric approach to amphibious operations, prioritizing logistical ingenuity over brute-force naval dominance. While not a standalone solution, they could reshape Taiwan’s defensive calculus by expanding viable landing sites. Yet their success ultimately depends on:
PLA’s ability to secure initial beachheads before deployment.
Effective force protection against anti-ship missiles and naval drones.
Adaptation by adversaries, who may develop countermeasures (e.g., seabed obstacles, loitering munitions).
Conclusion
The Shuiqiao system is a high-risk, high-reward asset—potentially transformative in permissive conditions but fraught with vulnerabilities in contested scenarios. Its deployment will test whether modular engineering can overcome the enduring challenges of amphibious warfare, or if it merely shifts bottlenecks from the water’s edge to the shoreline.
Key unresolved questions that will need to be looked at further include how the PLA will address potential sea-state limitations that challenged World War II Mulberry boats of similar, albeit older designs, how missiles and drones can be utilized against these barges.
As China refines the technology, observers must monitor real-world stress tests beyond controlled trials to gauge its true battlefield utility.
References
Key Articles and Reports on Shuiqiao-Class Barges
China’s Secret Weapon for Taiwan Invasion? Meet the Shuiqiao Bridge Barges – Andrew Erickson
Shuiqiao Bridge Barges: Assessing China’s Amphibious Capabilities – Debuglies
Stairway to Taiwan: The Chinese Amphibious Bridging System – Naval News
CMSI Note 14 – Bridges Over Troubled Waters: Shuiqiao-Class Landing Barges
Academic, Policy & Strategic Sources
Commentary & Strategic Assessment
Multimedia
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